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This paper provides a formal setting for the analysis of
the capital adequacy of an institution with deposits insured by a
third party. An insured depositor has a claim against the institu-
tion and a contingent claim against the insurer. This paper analyzes
the effect of the riskiness of the asset mix and the relative amount
of deposits and capital on the potential liability of the insurer.
It shows that an increase in asset risk, holding value constant,
increases the value of equity and raises the potential liability of





In troduc t ion
Since the first owner of a gold depository discovered that profits could
be made by lending some of the gold deposited for safekeeping, there has been
a concern for the "capital adequacy" of depository institutions. The idea is
simple enough. If the value of an institution's assets may decline in the
future, its deposits will generally be safer, the larger the current value of
assets in relation to the value of deposits. Defining capital as the differ-
ence between assets and deposits, the larger the ratio of capital to assets
(or the ratio of capital to deposits) the safer the deposits. At some level
capital will be "adequate" --i.e.the deposits will be "safe enough".
In most countries depository institutions are regulated and examined
frequently by regulatory authorities, and much of this effort is directed
toward insuring capital adequacy, broadly construed.
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However, the concept of capital adequacy is generally left undefined,
making it impossible to specify an explicit criterion by which one can judge
whether capital is adequate or not.
This paper provides a formal setting for the analysis of the
capital adequacy of an institution with deposits insured by a third party.
We emphasize the case in which the insurer charges a fixed premium per dollar
of deposits, since this is the policy of Federal insurance agencies in the
United States. However, most of the analysis is applicable to cases in which
insurance premiums vary with deposit risk. Much of the analysis can also be
used to examine cases in which deposits are uninsured, although we will not
consider such situations in detail.
To avoid circumlocution, we will refer to the depository institution as a
bank, but the analysis applies as well to savings and loan companies and other
depository institutions. Similarly, we will refer to the insurer as the FDIC
(Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation), although the analysis applies as well
to the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation and similar agencies.
This paper is designed to serve as an introductory analysis in a book
reporting the results of a number of studies of capital adequacy undertaken by
the National Bureau of Economic Research for the National Science Foundation.
Although much of the material is not new, the paper does bring together
a number of aspects that have previously been discussed separately and attempts
to provide a unified framework for dealing with the issues involved. In addi-
tion, new results are obtained and old ones given a more substantial theoretical
basis.-3-
The Value of the Insurer's Liability





All amounts are economic values --theprices that the assets (At) or claims
on assets (Dr, C) would sell for in a free market. Throughout this paper we
will assume that values are calculated in this manner and that we are dealing
with economic balance sheets, not traditional (accounting) balance sheets.
If there is any risk that the bank might not pay its depositors' claims
in full and on time, the economic value of such claims will be less than it
would be if there were no such risk. Define DF as the amount the deposit
claims would be worth if they were default-free. An insured depositor has,
in effect, two claims: one on the bank and another on the FDIC. Onewayto





















The depositors consider their claims default-free,with a corresponding
value of DFt. Since the bank may in fact default, itsliability to the deposi-
tors is only worth D. The differenceLt =DFt
-D,is the present value of
the FDIC's Liability.
Another way to portray the situation is the following:
bank FDIC depositors
—Dt DFt — — — — DF
C reserves net worth
To avoid a negative net worth, Cx ante, the FDIC shouldcharge a premium
that will bring in reserves equal to thepresent value of its liability.
Conversely, if the premium is pre-deterinjned, the FDIC shouldrequire that
the value of the deposit claims(Dt) differs from the default-free value (DF)
by no more than the premium.
Assume that for the relevant period the insurancepremium ispDF. Then
the required Condition is:





If this condition is met, capital isadequate; if not, capital is inadequate.
As we will see, the ratio on the left isa function of capital Coverage and
asset and liability risk. The determination ofa bank's capital adequacy thus
requires both an assessment of the economic values of allassets and liabilities
)
At t net worth =DF
t-5-
(including intangible assets such as the valueof a charter, monopoly power and/
or superior management and options such as acceptances,lines of credit, etc.)
and the estimation of all relevant risks.
The second depiction of the relationships among the three parties is partic-
ularly useful in one respect: it highlights the fact that the FDIC has the major
interest in monitoring and policing the behavior of the bank, since it must bear
the consequences of any default.
In the United States there is both explicit and implicit deposit insurance.
The FDIC insures only some deposit claims; excluded are foreign deposits, claims
owned by other banks (most of the "Federal funds") and portions of deposits above
$40,000 per private account and above $100,000 per government account. However,
the Federal Reserve System often provides a kind of de facto insurance for its
member banks by furnishing liquidity to a troubled bank so that uninsured deposi-
tors can be paid off before the bank is actually closed. Moreover, the FDIC tries,
wherever possible, to avoid actually closing a bank; arranging instead for another
bank to assume all the deposit claims. One way or another, almost all deposits
are insured.
The cost of such insurance is the explicit FDIC premium --apercentage of
(virtually) all deposits, including those nominally uninsured --plusat least
part of the interest forgone on reserves required to be held at a Federal Reserve
bank by members of the Federal Reserve system.
We will ignore these complexities, assuming that all deposits are insured
and, where relevant, that the premium is a fixed amount (p)per dollar of de-
posits (measured at their default-free values). In fact, this is quite an accu-
rate characterization of the actual situation in the United States.-6-
) AOne-period Case
We deal here with an extremely simple case in which there is only one rele-
vant period. This makes it possible to focus attention on asset default risk,
More complex cases in which there is also interest rate risk will be analyzed
in a subsequent paper.
A bank issues a certificate of deposit (CD) which promises a payment of
P1 dollars one year hence. The CD is "sold" for D0 dollars (thus D0 is the
current value of the bank's deposits). In addition, the bank issues common
stock for which it receives C dollars (C is thus the current value of the 0 0
bank's capital). The total amount is invested in an asset mix with a current
value of A (=D+ C ),andthe balance sheet is: 0 0 0
At the end of one year, the assets will have a value of l =(l+?01)A,
where is the rate of return on the asset mix between time zero and time 1
and tildes indicate variables whose actual values are uncertain ex ante. If
A1 exceeds P1, the CD holders will be paid in full and the stockholders will
retain the difference (- P1).Otherwise, the CD holders will receive all
that is available (r1)andthe stockholders will receive nothing.
Two decision variables are of interest: (1) the relative amounts of
deposits and capital and (2) the riskiness of the asset mix. Both affect
the value of the deposits.
We will use two different approaches to analyze this case. The first




is somewhat incomplete due to the absence of a general equilibrium model of
capital asset prices. The second approach does not suffer from this drawback,
since it does utilize a general equilibrium model (the time-state preference
paradigm). It also suggests a simple yet potentially valuable empirical
relationship between deposit risk and changes in capital value.
A Probabilistic Approach
Given a probability distribution for and an initial asset value A0,
the cumulative distribution of A1 is determined. It is shown by curve OXY
in Figure 1. Given the nature of the certificates of deposit, the cumulative
distribution of l' the amount paid to the depositors, is shown by curve OXQZ
in Figure 1. The expected payment, E(D1) is a weighted average of the likely
values, using the probabilities as weights. The expected value can never
exceed P1, and will generally be less.
What will be the effect of a ceteris paribus increase in assets relative
to deposits? A will be larger relative to P1 and the cumulative distribution
of A1 will have moved to the right, increasing the probability that P1 will
be paid and decreasing the probabilities associated with smaller payments.
As shown in Figure 2, the cumulative distribution of D1 will shift from OXQZ
to OX'QZ, increasing the expected payment from E(D1) to E(D).
If assets are very large relative to deposits and risk is small enough,
it may be virtually certain that deposits will be paid in full and on time.
In such a situation the expected value of the payment will equal the promised
amount (i.e. E(D1) =P1)
and the deposits will be default-free. Let






















maturing at time t.Thenthe present value of a certificate of deposit promis-





Deposits that are risky will be worth less than their default-free value
for two reasons. First, their expected payments will be less than promised.
Second, the expected return required by investors on such securities may be
greater than that required for default-free investments. In general, the
greater the difference between E(D1) and P1. the greater will be the difference
between D0 (the true value of the deposits) and DF (their default-free value).
This is illustrated in Figure 3. For generality all values are expressed
as proportions of the initial default-free value of the deposits. The primary
scale for the horizontal axis is the ratio of assets to the default-free value
of deposits but monotonic transformations can be used to obtain scales for
capital-deposit and capital-asset ratios, if the 'book value of capital" --
theamount obtained by subtracting the default-free value of deposits from the












As shown in Figure 3, ceteris paribus, the greater the amount of assets
covering deposits, the smaller will be the difference between the actual value-10-
A /DF
00














(A -DF)/DF 0 0 0
(A-DF)/A 0 0 0
0 .333 .5
Figure 3—ii—
of the deposits and the default-free value. Of course the balance sheet must
balance, since the sumofthe claims on a set of assets is worth neither more
nor less than the assets. Thus C0 must equal A0 -D0,and CIDF must equal
(A -D)/DF ,asshown. The distance between the curve and the horizontal 0 0 0
line is also of interest --itis the value of the FDIC liability per unit of
/DF -D\
deposits
(°DF0) ; if this is less than the premium (p), capital is ade-
quate; if not, it is not.
What would be the effect of a ceteris paribus increase in the riskiness
of the asset mix? The answer depends on the specification of the ceteris
paribus conditions. Most relevant for present purposes is a change in which
the value of the asset mix does not change while the "spread" of end-of-period
asset values increases. We will term this a value-preserving spread.




C'+D'=C +D o o 0 0
Figure 4 shows the situation before and after the change. The new cumu-
lative distribution of is assumed to cross the old distribution at only one
point (At). Thus the increase in "spread" can be considered unambiguous.
*
The point at which the distributions cross need not be the mean of the initial
distribution. For example, increasing the spread, holding the mean constant
may well decrease value; if so, the new distribution must have a higher mean
in order to keep value constant. A plausible situation would thus have the
new distribution cross the old one below the p =.50level. This contrasts
with the more familiar construct of a mean-preserving spread. It corresponds
more closely to the notion of a utility-preserving spread, but to apply the
latter concept one would have to invoke a social utility function or assume
a limited degree of variation in individuals' utility curves. The concept of
a value-preserving spread is more general and leads to economically (and empir-
















rwocasesneed to be considered. First, assume that P1 < A .Asshown
in Figure5, when asset risl increases, the cumulative distribution shifts
from curve OXQZ to curve OX'QZ. The change clearly makes depositors worse off,
for the probability that ￿ X is greater or equal to the former value for all
X. Thus will be smaller and C larger as a result of the increase in asset
risk.
Now consider the other possible case --i.e.one in which P1 ￿ 4.Figure
6 shows the cumulative distribution of l --theamount paid to shareholders --
beforeand after the change. Clearly the shift from curve OP1XZ to curve OP1X'Z
makes equity holders better off, for the probability that C1 ￿ X is less than or
equal to its former value for all X. Thus C will be larger and D smaller as
0 0
a result of the increase in asset risk.
Both cases lead to the same conclusion. An increase in asset risk, holding
value constant, generally increases the value of equity and decreases the value
of deposit claims. The riskier the asset mix, the lower will be the D /DF curve 00
in Figure 3. For any given ratio of assets to the default-free value of deposits,
a larger portion of value will be represented by capital (C0) and a smaller
portion by deposits (D) as the risk of the assets increases.
Recall that the FDIC liability per dollar (Lt) equals DF0
-
D0•Other
things equal, the greater the asset coverage (A0/DF0) and the smaller the asset
risk, the safer the deposits and the smaller this ratio.
A Complete Market Approach
The very existence of financial intermediaries provides evidence that
transactions and information cost money and that some individuals do not find



















many of the qualitative conclusions obtained by analyzing a transactions-and
information-Cost-free market may apply as well to real (competitive) financial
markets.
Assume that there are S possible states of the world one year hence, and
that the return on a bank's assets from time zero to time 1 in state s is r1.
Then the payment to depositors in state s will be:
=mm
[Ao(l÷rois) 1]




If,by buying arid selling existing securities, an investor can obtain any desired
proportions of payments in different states, the financial market is said to be
complete. Equilibrium in such a market is characterized by a series of implicit
or explicit prices for state-contingent claims --priceswhich are the same whether
one wishes to purchase or sell such claims (since transactions costs are assumed to
be zero).
Now, let:
P =theprice in time zero certain dollars of a ols
default-free promise to receive $1 if and only
if state s occurs one year hence




S S A pA =' p (l+r)A o ols is ols ols 0 s=l s=i
S
or: p1(i+r1) =1 (2)
s=i
In such a market, the value of the bank's CD would be:
D0 =
s1 {tnin[A0(l+r1), 1] } (3)
and the value of its common stock would be:
=sl{A0l0i
-mm
[A0(l+r1), Pi] } (4)
Clearly:
C +D =pJA(l+r )=A (5) o o olso ols 1 o s=1 /
Thusan uninsured bank could raise just enough capital topay the market value
for its assets, no matter which mix of deposits and stock it electedto employ.
Moreover, each source of capital would be priced appropriately. While this is
almost tautological, it does show that ina complete financial market, there is
no "optimal" financing mix.
*
Thisassumes that no resources are lost in the event of bankruptcy. If this
assumption is dropped, with all others maintained, situation that could
lead to bankruptcy in any state would be suboptimal,as shown in John H. Kareken
and Neil Wallace "Deposit Insurance and Bank Regulation: A PartialEquilibrium
Exposition", Staff Report #15, Research Dept., The Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis, January 1977.—17—
Given this formulation, we can show how the information required to draw
Figure 4 could be obtained and how the curves would actually appear. Note
that:
S




D0 =s1p1{min [A(l+r1) 1]}￿DF (7)
Without loss of generality, we will assume that the S states are numbered
sothatr ￿r ols ol,s+l
Given A and P1, there will be a set of states 1, ...,Kin which the CD's
will receive less than promised, and a set of states K+l, ...,Sin which they
will receive the full amount promised. Moreover, as A/P1 grows, K will decrease
(but only at discrete points).
The definition of K insures that:
(l+rlk)A < P1 for k =1,...K















(1)SKisconstant for ranges of asset values over which K isunchanged
(2) SK ￿1(by(9)and (2))




These relationships implythat the curve relating D to A (and thus thecurve
relatingD/DF to A/DF) is piecewise linear,concave, and bounded by both the
45° line from theorigin and the horizontal line for which D =DF,as illus-
trated in Figure 7.
The larger the number ofstates, the larger the number of linear segments,
and the closer the piecewise linearcurve in Figure 7 will approach the smooth






DF /DF 0 0
1.0 A /DF0 0
probability probability
of of
default =1.0 default =0.
(K=S) (K=0)-20-
Nowconsider a change in the risk of the asset mix unaccompanied byany
change in the default-free value of the deposits. As in the previous section,
we wish to keep the value of the assets unchanged while increasing the "spread"
of the outcomes in an unambiguous manner. The most straightforward approach is
the following. Let primes denote the new values. Then:
r' =r +A (10) ols ols s
where:
A ￿Ofors=l, ...,s* S




(11) ols s s=1
Note that these relationships imply that:
k
(p )￿0 for all K (12) ols s s=1
Now, consider a spread small enough so that default still occurs in the
same states (1, ...,K).Then:
K S
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s=K+].
(K =D+0 0 s=l / (13)—21-
But, from (12), D ￿
D0and such an increase in asset risk will generally
decrease the value of the deposit claims.
Deposit Risk and Change in Capital Value
Formula (13) can also be used to show an empirically useful relationship
between the effect of a shift in asset risk and the initial riskiness of the
deposits.
The change in deposit value is:
K
=D'-D= ols )A (14)
s=l
Given a vector theparenthesized expression is related to K as shown in
Figure 8. To the left of some s*, the function is monotonic downward; to the
right it is monotonic upward. Recall that K is the number of states in which
default occurs. Unless this is large (K> s*), the following relationship
holds:
The larger the initial risk of the deposits (number of states
in which default will occur), the larger the decline in deposit
value due to an increase in asset risk.
Recall, however, that D +C=A.Since a value-preserving spread leaves
A0 unchanged, C =- iD.The relationship between C and K (shown in
Figure 9) is thus the mirror image of that shown in Figure 8. Unless the
number of states in which default occurs is large (K> s*):
The larger the initial risk of the deposits, the greater the
increase in capital value due to an increase in asset risk
unaccompanied by a change in asset value.-22-
Within limits, it may be possible to measure the effect on the economic (market)
value of capital of a change in asset risk, holding asset value constant. The
greater the magnitude of the "risk shift" in value from the FDIC to a bank's
stockholders, the greater the initial value of the FDIC liability. The magni-
tude of this observed responsiveness may thus be an observable surrogate for
the value of the FDIC liability. Subsequent studies will attempt to exploit
this relationship using both time-series and cross-sectional data.
)0
0
-23-
Figure 8
Figure 9
5* K
K